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People with different types of bodies tend to think differently in predictable ways, even 
about abstract ideas that seem far removed from bodily experience.1-4  Right- and left-
handers implicitly associate positive ideas like goodness and honesty more strongly with 
their dominant side of space, the side on which they can interact with their environment 
more fluently, and negative ideas with their non-dominant side.1,2  This suggests a role for 
motor experience in shaping abstract thoughts.  Yet, previous evidence is also consistent 
with an experience-independent account.  Here we show that right-handers’ tendency to 
associate ‘good’ with right and ‘bad’ with left can be reversed due to both long- and short-
term changes in motor fluency.  Among stroke patients who were right-handed prior to 
unilateral cerebrovascular accident (CVA), those with left-hemiparesis (following right 
CVA) associated good with right, but those with right-hemiparesis (following left CVA) 
associated good with left, like natural left-handers.  A similar pattern was found in healthy 
right-handers whose right or left hand was temporarily handicapped in a laboratory 
training task.  Motor experience influences judgments of good and bad, overriding any 
predispositions due to natural handedness.  Even highly abstract ideas depend, in part, on 
how people interact with the physical world.   
 When people talk about good and bad things they often use spatial metaphors.  Across 
many languages and cultures, ideas with positive and negative emotional valence can be 
expressed in terms of up and down (on top of the world means ‘happy,’ down in the dumps 
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means ‘sad’) or right and left (the right answer means ‘correct,’ two left feet means ‘clumsy’).1,5  
Beyond using spatial language, people also think about good and bad things using mental 
representations of space and motion, as evidenced by behavioural experiments.6-11  People 
express more pride in their accomplishments when they are induced to sit up tall as opposed to 
slumping down.6  Likewise, they retrieve more positive emotional memories when asked to 
move objects upward and more negative memories when asked to move them downward.7  
Implicitly, people conceptualize good things as higher and bad things as lower on an imaginary 
spatial continuum, consistent with patterns in language. 
 People also spatialize good and bad on the horizontal axis, but not always as expressions 
in language suggest.  Rather, associations of abstract qualities like goodness and honesty with 
left-right space vary according to people’s handedness.   When asked to decide which of two 
products to buy, which of two job applicants to hire, or which of two alien creatures looks more 
trustworthy, right-handers tend to prefer the product, person, or creature presented on their right 
side but left-handers tend to prefer the one on their left.1  This pattern persists even when people 
make judgments orally, without using their hands to respond.   
 Links between valence and left-right space can also be observed beyond the laboratory, 
in spontaneous speech and gesture.  In the final debates of the 2004 and 2008 US presidential 
elections, which involved two right-handers (Kerry, Bush) and two left-handers (Obama, 
McCain), right-handed candidates produced a higher proportion of right-hand gestures during 
positive-valence speech and left-hand gestures during negative-valence speech; the opposite 
pattern was found in the left-handed candidates.2  
 Overall, these patterns cannot be predicted or explained based on conventions in 
language and culture, which consistently associate good with right and bad with left.1,12  Rather, 
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results support the body-specificity hypothesis, showing that people with different kinds of 
bodies think differently in predictable ways, even about highly abstract ideas.1-4 
Yet, an important question remains: Why do right- and left-handers associate good and 
bad things with opposite sides of space?  On one possibility, people’s experience of interacting 
with the physical environment more fluently on their dominant side and less fluently on their 
non-dominant side could lead to the formation of implicit associations in memory.  More fluent 
perceptuo-motor processing often leads to more positive feelings and evaluations.13-16  The 
dominant side may be good in people’s minds because dominant-side actions tend to be more 
fluent than non-dominant side actions.  On an alternative possibility, different spatial mappings 
of good and bad could result from genetically-determined neurological differences between 
right- and left-handers: That which gives rise to handedness could also give rise to handedness-
related differences in judgments.1,17-22  In principle, the body-specific association between space 
and valence could be experience-independent.   
Here we investigated a role for motor experience in establishing implicit associations 
between space and valence.  We tested whether long- and short-term changes in motor fluency 
can influence judgments about the spatial correlates of good and bad.  To evaluate the effects of 
long-term changes, we tested stroke patients with hemiparesis (weakness or paralysis on one 
side of the body) following unilateral CVA.  All patients (n = 10) were right-handed prior to 
brain injury.  Right-hemisphere CVA led to left hemiparesis in four of the patients, preserving 
their natural right-handedness.  Left-hemisphere CVA led to right hemiparesis in the other six 
patients making them effectively left-handed, post-stroke.  Amid filler tasks, patients performed 
a two-question diagram task known to elicit contrasting space-valence judgments from healthy 
right- and left-handers.1  Patients saw a cartoon character’s head in the center of a page between 
two empty boxes, one on his right and the other on his left (Supplementary Fig. 1).  They were 
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told that the character loves zebras and thinks they are good, but hates pandas and thinks they 
are bad (or vice versa).  Participants indicated where the character would put each of the 
animals if he were going to put the good animal in one box and the bad animal in the other.  The 
assignment of positive/negative valence to the panda and zebra was counterbalanced across 
participants, as was the order in which participants were asked about the good and bad animals.  
They responded orally, not manually; there was no manual motor component to the diagram 
task, eliminating any trivial online effects of motor fluency on responses.   
For 9 out of the 10 participants, judgments varied according to their post-stroke motor 
fluency (sign test on 9 vs. 1, P = .02).  All four left-hemiparesis patients (100%) indicated that 
the good animal should go in the right box and the bad animal in the left box, consistent with 
their pre- and postmorbid right-hand dominance.  By contrast, five of the six right-hemiparesis 
patients (83%) indicated that the good animal should go in the left box and the bad animal in the 
right box, contrary to their premorbid right-handedness but consistent with their post-stroke left-
hand dominance (association of post-stroke dominant hand [right, left] with response 
[good=right, bad=right]: Fisher’s exact test P = .05, 2-tailed; Pearson’s χ2 = 8.67, df = 1, P = 
.003). 
Prolonged reversal of natural hand dominance can reverse right handers’ usual tendency 
to associate good with right.  Yet, the stroke patients’ brain injuries not only led to lasting 
changes in motor fluency but also to long-term neural reorganization.  The locus of CVAs 
varied widely across patients (see Table 1); therefore it would be complicated to explain the 
present results based on neural changes, per se, as opposed to resultant changes in motor 
fluency.  Still, we cannot rule out the possibility of such an explanation, at least in principle.   
In order to determine whether changes in motor fluency can affect space-valence 
mappings independent of any long-term neural reorganization, we conducted a two-part training 
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experiment.  Healthy right-handed participants (n = 55) first performed a motor fluency task 
(training phase), and then the same diagram task used with the stroke patients (test phase).   
For the training phase, participants arranged dominoes in a symmetrical pattern on a 
tabletop.  They placed dominoes on horizontal rows of dots, moving both hands symmetrically.  
They were instructed to fill as many rows of dots as possible in 12 minutes, as a test of motor 
coordination. 
Participants were randomly assigned to wear a bulky ski glove on either their right or 
left hand, with the other ski glove dangling from the wrist of the gloved hand (see 
Supplementary Fig. 2).  This made grasping and positioning dominoes much more difficult with 
one hand than the other.  For about half of the participants, wearing the glove on their left hand 
preserved their natural right-handedness.  For the other half of the participants, wearing the 
glove on their right hand turned them transiently ‘left-handed,’ reversing the normal relationship 
between motor fluency and their left and right sides of space.  
After completing the domino task, participants removed the ski glove.  They were led 
into a different room, by a different experimenter, for a series of three unrelated questionnaire 
studies, one of which was the ‘animals’ task.  Like the stroke patients, the ski glove-trained 
participants indicated where the cartoon character would place the good and bad animals orally, 
without using their hands to respond, eliminating trivial forms of transfer from the training 
phase to the test phase.   
Motor experience influenced participants’ spatial mapping of good and bad.  Participants 
whose left hand was handicapped during training (preserving their natural right-handedness) 
tended to assign the good animal to the right box, whereas participants whose right hand was 
handicapped (making them effectively left-handed) tended to assign the good animal to the left 
box (Wald χ2 = 8.01, df = 1, P = .005, OR = 5.67, 95% C.I. = 1.71-18.83; Fig. 1).  Extensive 
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debriefing ensured that this effect was not due to participants detecting any connection between 
the training and test phases, which were ostensibly unrelated.   
Results of the ski glove study demonstrate a causal relationship between motor fluency 
and judgments about the abstract ideas of goodness and badness.  The effects of short-term 
motor training are presumably temporary, but the same associative learning mechanisms that 
partly determine people’s performance in the laboratory may result in the long-term changes we 
found in stroke patients, and may shape natural right- and left-handers’ space-valence mappings 
in the course of ordinary motor experience.  Using our lopsided bodies, and therefore interacting 
with the physical environment more fluently on one side of space than the other, may serve as a 
kind of natural ‘motor training.’   
This does not rule out the possibility that innate neurobiological factors could also 
contribute to the body-specific mappings observed in natural righties and lefties.  But the fact 
that right-handers’ judgments reversed after long- or short-term training demonstrates that 
motor experience is sufficient to determine the direction of space-valence associations, and even 
to temporarily overwhelm any innate predisposition to associate ‘good’ with one’s naturally 
dominant side.   
Motor fluency has been linked previously with preferences for things that people can act 
on with their hands.  People prefer graspable objects like spatulas when their handles are 
oriented so as to make them easy to grasp. 5  Skilled typists prefer pairs of letters that are easy to 
type, even when they are not typing.13  These effects can be readily explained in terms of motor 
affordances: People mentally simulate performing the action that an object would afford if they 
were to act on it, such as picking up a spatula or typing letters, and their preference judgments 
vary according to how fluent this action would be.   
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Yet, motor tendencies also predict judgments about abstract ideas and things people can 
never manipulate with their hands, as when left- and right-handers attribute more intelligence or 
honesty to alien creatures depicted on their dominant side of a page.1  In the present study, 
changes in motor fluency influenced participants’ judgments about intangible qualities 
(goodness and badness) of imaginary zoo animals (zebras and pandas, which would be unlikely 
to afford manipulation with one hand even if they were real).  These results demonstrate a 
causal link between manual motor fluency and preference judgments, but suggest that this link 
is not necessarily mediated by mental simulation of action affordances.  Associations between 
emotional valence and left-right space may be established through habits of fluent and disfluent 
hand actions, but these associations generalize to influence judgments of things people can 
never see or touch.  It remains a challenge for ongoing research to characterize the 
neurocognitive mechanisms by which physical experience generalizes to shape abstract 
conceptions of good and bad.   
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Figure legend 
Figure 1. Effects of short-term motor training on the spatial correlates of good 
and bad.  Results of the dominoes-ski glove experiment showed strong effect of motor 
training, by binary logistic regression (Wald χ2=8.01, df=1, p=.005).  Right-handed 
participants who wore the cumbersome glove on their left hand during motor training 
were more likely to assign the good animal to the right box, like natural right-handers 
(z=2.29, p=.01; left columns).  Right-handers who wore the glove on their right hand 
were more likely to assign the good animal to the left box, like natural left-handers 
(z=1.84, p=.03; right columns).  
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Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Patient Demographic and Clinical Information for Experiment 1 
Patient ID Gender Age 
(years) 
Education 
(years) 
Time post-stroke 
(years) 
Locus of unilateral CVA 
TS474 F 50 11 8 R parietal cortex 
KG593 F 48 12 4 R frontal, temporal, parietal 
cortex, and basal ganglia 
NH192 F 71 12 12 R thalamus 
TN694 F 31 12 7 R frontal, parietal cortex, and 
basal ganglia 
QN435 M 55 12 8 L frontal, parietal cortex, and 
pons 
XK342 F 56 12 10 L frontal, parietal white matter; 
L occipital cortex and centrum 
semiovale 
CD141 F 51 16 11 L insular, perisylvian cortex, 
and basal ganglia 
TD360 M 56 12 9 L temporal cortex, centrum 
semiovale, and basal ganglia 
LM292 M 63 18 10 L basal ganglia 
BC236 M 63 18 17 L frontal, parietal cortex and 
basal ganglia 
Notes: F = Female, M = Male, R = right, L = left, CVA = cerebrovascular accident. The location of the 
CVA was determined by the attending neurologist at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 
following visual inspection of post-stroke clinical computerized axial tomography (CAT) or magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) scans. 
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Methods  
Experiment 1.   
Participants.  Ten stroke patients (4 men, 6 women; mean age = 54.4 years), all native English 
speakers, participated in this study after providing informed consent.  All patients were strongly 
right-handed prior to stroke, according to their original post-stroke clinical assessment with the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (pre-stroke EHI scores for all patients ≥ 90).22  Postmorbidly, 
the 4 patients who had suffered right unilateral CVAs (left-hemiparesis) remained right-handed 
(mean post-stroke EHI = 87.50 ±2.5), whereas the 6 patients who had suffered left unilateral 
CVAs (right-hemiparesis) essentially became left-handed (mean post-stroke EHI= -76.67 
±10.54).  EHI scores differed between the two groups (t(8) = 12.32, P = .001; Mann-Whitney U 
test, Z = -2.60, P = .01).  Basic demographic and lesion location information by patient is 
presented in Table 1.   
Materials and procedure.  The patients were tested at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital. 
They responded orally to a two-question diagram task, shown previously to elicit a body-
specific pattern of responses in healthy left- and right-handers.  Materials and procedures were 
identical to those used in Experiment 3 of Casasanto (2009), except that the original Dutch 
instructions were translated into English (Supplementary Fig. 1).1  
Debriefing.  After testing, the patients were asked why they assigned the good animal to the 
box that they chose.  No one mentioned hand dominance or motor fluency.  They were then 
asked explicitly whether their handedness or the way they use their hands could have influenced 
their decisions.  The most common answer (n = 4) was “I don’t know.”  Three participants 
indicated that it was possible the way they use their hands could have influenced their 
judgments; importantly, they only agreed to this possibility after it was explicitly suggested to 
them, and even then they only responded “maybe.”  The remaining three patients expressly 
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denied that handedness or motor habits could have influenced their judgments, even though all 
three responded in accordance with the experimental hypothesis.   
 In summary, no patient reported having responded on the basis of their pre-stroke 
handedness or their post-stroke motor fluency, even when this possibility was suggested to them 
explicitly.  This is consistent with previous research showing that people are largely unaware of 
the spatio-motor factors that influence their preference judgments.1,24 
Experiment 2.   
Participants.  Fifty-five native Dutch speakers from the Radboud University community 
participated in exchange for payment.  Participants were recruited in two cohorts (Cohort 1: n = 
28; Cohort 2: n = 27).  Data from Cohorts 1 and 2 were initially analyzed separately, to provide 
an internal replication of this study.  Since no difference in the strength of the training effect 
was found between cohorts, their data were combined for subsequent analyses.   
All participants were right-handed according to pre-screening and to a Dutch adaptation 
of the EHI, administered at the end of the testing session.22,25  Two of the participants were 
excluded from analysis on the basis of the debriefing (see below).  For the remaining 53 
participants, the mean EHI score was 78.73 ±2.59.  Twenty-six of the participants (EHI=82.20 
±3.25) were randomly assigned to wear the left ski glove during training, and twenty-seven 
(EHI=75.39 ±3.99) to wear the right glove.  EHI scores did not differ significantly between 
groups (t(51) = 1.32, ns).   
Materials and procedure   
Training phase.  Participants were seated at a table, the top of which was covered with a mat, 
120cm wide × 60cm deep, with 80 dots spaced approximately 12cm apart, in 8 horizontal rows.  
In the center of the mat, on the edge closest to the participant, there was a cardboard box 
containing two sets of dominoes (84 pieces).  Ostensibly as a test of ‘motor coordination,’ 
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participants were instructed to place dominoes on dots as quickly as possible for 12 minutes, 
under the following conditions.   
 Each participant was assigned to wear a bulky ski glove on either the right or left hand, 
with the other ski glove dangling from the same wrist.  To avoid calling attention to the 
assignment of the glove to one hand or the other, the experimenter handed the participant only 
one of the gloves, and then fastened the second glove to the wrist of the first once the participant 
had put it on.  Participants removed the dominoes from the box in pairs, one in each hand, and 
were instructed to place them on the dots in a symmetrical pattern, moving the hands in 
synchrony, using the left hand to place dominoes on the left side of the table and the right hand 
on the right side of the table.  Dominoes were placed on dots standing upright, with the spots 
facing the participant.  If dominoes were knocked over, the participant had to repair the 
arrangement before proceeding, using the appropriate hand.  They were not allowed to use the 
free hand to prevent the dangling ski glove from knocking over the dominoes, or otherwise to 
help the gloved hand.  Participants knew that they were videotaped.  Although some participants 
occasionally cheated, using the free hand to help position dominoes between the fingers of the 
gloved hand, in general all participants complied closely with these instructions.   
 
Test phase.  After the training phase, participants were escorted to a different room, where they 
were tested by a different experimenter on three brief, unrelated questionnaire studies.  The 
change of location and personnel was intended to enhance the impression that the training and 
test phases were unrelated.  For the relevant questionnaire, participants saw the same diagram 
used in Experiment 1, and responded to the same prompts (in Dutch rather than English).   
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Debriefing.  Before participants were dismissed, they were debriefed extensively by the second 
experimenter about the purpose of the experiments, and also asked standard demographic 
questions as fillers.  Even though the participants were asked explicitly whether they noticed 
any relationships among the experiments, only 2 of the 55 participants reported suspecting any 
connection between the critical training and test phases.  Data from these participants were 
excluded from further analyses.  According to the debriefing data, the 53 participants included 
in the analyses were unaware of any connection between the training and test phases, and were 
unaware their responses on the good-bad animals task were influenced by their previous motor 
experience.  

